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 Sharecropping and Investment in
 Agriculture in Early Modern France
 PHILIP T. HOFFMAN
 The paper examines the spread of sharecropping that followed a wave of
 investment in agriculture in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France. Using
 results from the modem theory of share contracts, it argues that sharecropping
 was a means of risk sharing that favored both landlords and tenants. Although the
 evidence used in this paper comes from France, the results may well apply to
 other areas of early modem Europe.
 FROM the mid-sixteenth century to the early 1770s, the money of
 wealthy Frenchmen flowed into land. Encouraged by royal tax
 policies that favored privileged investors, large numbers of merchants,
 lawyers, royal officers, and nobles bought up vineyards and fields from
 impoverished peasants. They subsequently leased their holdings to
 sharecroppers, who often turned out to be the very peasants who had
 originally owned the land. Thus in 1576 a beleaguered laboureur named
 Jehan Crespeau sold his farm, land, and buildings to his seigneur. The
 same day the lord leased the property back to Crespeau for a share of
 the crops.'
 While historians have paid considerable attention to this wave of
 investment in agriculture, they have not devised a convincing explana-
 tion for the investors' predilection for sharecropping. Here, perhaps,
 some recent investigations by economic theorists can cast some light
 upon the phenomenon. To explain the prevalence of sharecropping
 arrangements in the contemporary world, economic theorists have
 devised a number of arguments for sharecropping, of which two seem
 particularly relevant to early modern France.2
 Journal of Economic History, Vol, XLII, No. 1 (March 1982). ? The Economic History
 Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
 The author is affiliated with the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125.
 ' Louis Merle, La mgtairie et 1',volution agraire de la Gdtine poitevine de lafin du Moyen Age a
 la Revolution (Paris, 1958), p. 53. See Philip T. Hoffman, "Investment in Agriculture in Early
 Modern France," California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper 406 (Sept.
 1981), for an analysis of the wave of investment in land in early modern France and for a more
 detailed discussion of sharecropping.
 2 For what follows, see David Newbery, "Risk Sharing, Sharecropping and Uncertain Labour
 Markets," Review of Economic Studies, 44 (Oct. 1977), 585-94, the latest word on the subject. See
 also Joseph Stiglitz, "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic
 Studies, 41 (April 1974), 219-55; Clive Bell and Pinhas Zusman, "A Bargaining Theoretic Approach
 to Cropsharing Contracts," The American Economic Review, 66 (Sept. 1976), 578-88; and William
 Hallagan, "Self Selection by Contractual Choice and the Theory of Sharecropping," Bell Journal
 of Economics (Autumn 1978), 344-54. Economic historians have of course contributed greatly to
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 Agriculture is risky and to a certain extent unpredictable. If a landlord
 hires labor to work his land, he assumes all the risks of blights, crop
 failures, and bad weather. If he rents his property for a fixed fee, it is the
 tenant who bears the burden of the risk. The sharecropping contract, by
 contrast, allows the landlord and the person who actually farms the land
 to share the risks, which would seem to have advantages for both of
 them if they are risk averse. The opportunity to share the risk will in fact
 benefit both the landlord and sharecropper, but only under certain
 conditions. First, the landlord has to be able to enforce contracts that
 specify the work a sharecropper is to perform-how much plowing, how
 much hoeing, and so on. If contracts cannot be enforced, sharecroppers
 have a great incentive to undersupply labor, which would make
 landlords shy away from sharecropping. Second, at least one of two
 additional conditions has to be met:
 1. There must be risks in the market for labor, land, or one of the
 other factors of production. These risks could involve, for example,
 having to pay higher and unpredictable wages for temporary laborers at
 harvest time.
 2. There must be economies of scale in agriculture. They could derive
 from the lack of a rental market for work animals, wagons, or other
 expensive pieces of farm equipment. Without a rental market for draft
 animals, for example, a farmer would have to buy a team of oxen,
 whether his farm were large or small. With a large farm, he could spread
 the cost of the oxen over more acres, and his average cost would be
 lower. The economies of scale might also stem from the fixed costs of
 enforcing the clauses in a labor, sharecropping, or rental contract, or
 they could reflect untraded factors of production, such as a farmer's
 skill.
 If either of these two conditions obtain and landlords can enforce
 contracts, then sharecropping will present both the landlord and the
 potential sharecropper with advantages as a means of reducing risk.3
 One might of course doubt that such theories would be relevant to the
 Old Regime.4 At least one contemporary, however, perceived in
 sharecropping some of the same advantages that modern economists
 have claimed for it. This was Olivier de Serres, who in 1600 published
 the classic early modern French treatise on agriculture, Le theatre de 1'
 agriculture. In this work, the fruit of his own experience as a landlord
 and farmer, de Serres considered the various drawbacks and advantages
 of farming land with tenants, sharecroppers, or hired labor. He noted
 that whereas a renter "takes on the responsibility at his own loss or
 the literature on sharecropping. For references, see, in particular, the works by Robert Higgs and
 Joseph Reid cited in Reid's overview of the literature, "The Theory of Share Tenancy Revisited-
 Again," Journal of Political Economy, 85 (April 1977), 403-07.
 3 For a discussion of these conditions, see Hoffman, "Investment in Agriculture."
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 profit," a sharecropper "does not risk everything in advance as he only
 contracts to cultivate the land for a share." Given the difficulties of
 finding tenants who could or would take on these risks, de Serres
 recommended sharecropping to all but the biggest landlords. He also
 felt that sharecropping was superior to hired labor for absentee land-
 lords because the costs of supervising laborers were too high,' He -does
 not recapitulate the theory of sharecropping in its entirety, but his
 statement that sharecroppers bear less risk than renters suggests that he
 recognized the risk-sharing advantages of a share system. His remarks
 about the supervision of labor also recall certain features of the theory.
 It is thus not completely anachronistic to apply the theory to early
 modern France.
 We can therefore ask whether the conditions that explain sharecrop-
 ping theoretically were actually met in the French countryside. If we
 consider first the enforceability of labor contracts, it is clear that
 landlords certainly tried to specify how much labor their sharecroppers
 were to contribute. In addition to stipulating traditional seasonal labors
 of the agricultural year, sharecropping contracts commonly required the
 sharecroppers to perform a certain amount of carting. Sharecroppers
 also had to maintain or improve the property, perhaps by carrying a
 specified quantity of eroded soil back to the top of the hillside, or by
 building so many feet of hedges or enclosures each year.6 Proving that
 landlords always managed to enforce these clauses would require
 further research, but at first glance it would not seem to have been
 difficult for a landlord or his agent to verify that the tasks had been
 performed. If the sharecropper did not plow, for example, there would
 be no crop, and a landlord could actually see whether hedges or
 enclosures had been built. Moreover, investors who bought land tended
 to purchase property close to their own residence, so that it could easily
 be inspected, and sometimes they even summered in the midst of their
 agricultural possessions. Finally, the sharecropping contracts usually
 contained a variety of penalties against tenants who did not perform
 their duties.7
 If the landlords were able to enforce the labor clauses in contracts,
 what about the two other conditions that figure in the theory? To begin
 with, at least one of the factor markets, the market for labor, does seem
 4 For the problems of applying theory to traditional Europe, see Hoffman, "Investment in
 Agriculture."
 s Olivier de Serres, Le theatre d'agriculture (Paris, 1600), pp. 52-53.
 6 Merle, La metairie, pp. 161-85, 205-26; Serge Dontenwill, "Les baux a mi-fruits en roannais et
 brionnais aux XVIIe et XVIIIe sitcles," in Lyon et l'Europe: Hommes et Societes: Melanges
 d'histoire offerts d Richard Gascon, vol. 2 (Lyon, 1980), pp. 179-208; Georges Durand, Vin, vigne
 et vignerons en Lyonnais et Beaujolais (Lyon, 1979), pp. 310-11. Examples abound in notarial
 registers.
 7 Richard Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siecle: Lyon et ses marchands, 2 vol.
 (Paris, 1971), pp. 813-62; Merle, La metairie, pp. 163-67, 186-93, 224-26.
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 to have been risky. In the Gatine poitevine described by Louis Merle,
 for example, farmers often had to hire a large number of laborers at
 harvest time, but they had no idea in advance how many hands they
 would need. The higher wages they paid for these short-term laborers
 reflected the risks involved.8
 There is also reason to believe that economies of scale existed in
 agriculture. First of all, important pieces of farm equipment could not be
 rented, at least in certain regions. To return to the Gatine again, farmers
 apparently could rent cattle from livestock raisers who maintained
 "banks" of animals. No doubt they could also hire a plowing team for a
 day. But despite these well-developed rental markets, farmers could not
 lease one of the most important and most expensive pieces of farm
 machinery, wagons, which were by far the costliest item in farm
 inventories and absolutely essential for many of the daily tasks stipulat-
 ed in sharecropping contracts. Unable to rent or to build the wagons he
 needed, a farmer would have to spend one or two hundred livres, an
 amount equal to four or five times the value of all his other farm
 equipment.9 This high cost would be an obvious source of economies of
 scale.
 Similarly, the expense of supervising hired laborers, tenant farmers,
 or sharecroppers (including the costs of enforcing contracts) would also
 produce economies of scale. Olivier de Serres, for one, discussed these
 expenses in great detail. In his opinion the costs of supervision made
 hired labor prohibitively expensive, save for individuals who resided on
 their own farms. Renters were also costly, for a landlord had to find a
 reliable tenant and then make sure that he did not neglect the farm
 buildings. In de Serres's opinion, the best solution for absentee land-
 lords (save for the biggest, who could attract large-scale, solvent
 tenants) was sharecropping. In effect, he recognized the advantages of
 sharecropping in the face of economies of scale. 10 The landlords who let
 their land out for shares were evidently aware of these economies of
 scale, for they almost inevitably tried to consolidate and enlarge their
 farms.
 Since the various conditions of the theory seem to hold, we have a
 ready explanation for the reason why a number of landlords (though not
 all) resorted to sharecropping instead of rental contracts or wage
 labor.1" What then were the consequences of the spread of share farming
 and the wave of investment in agriculture? Traditionally, sharecropping
 8 Merle, La metairie, p. 127.
 9 Ibid., pp. 109, 117-18.
 10 de Serres, Le theatre d'agriculture, pp. 45-54. For examples, see Dontenwill, "Les baux a mi-
 fruits," pp. 179-208. It should be pointed out that the theory of sharecropping is consistent with the
 coexistence of rental, share, and wage-labor farming; see Hoffman, "Investment in Agriculture."
 11 Why sharecropping did not appear in the north of France (or Germany) will require further
 research. Here the theory of sharecropping can at least furnish us with hypotheses.
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 and the privileged landlords have been held responsible for the ills of
 French agriculture. Historians have argued that short-term share con-
 tracts with rigid clauses eliminated any incentives for investment or
 technological change. And they have blamed the absentee landlords for
 exploiting such an inefficient system. The economic theory, by contrast,
 suggests that sharecropping was relatively efficient, and the historical
 evidence tends to confirm this. The contracts often extended over a
 number of years (five to nine years in the Gatine, for example, six years
 northwest of Lyon), and it therefore seems factually incorrect to say
 that sharecropping sacrificed long-term development to short-term
 profit. If the clauses in individual contracts drawn from particular
 regions seem rigid, they nevertheless varied from place to place and
 evolved over time.'2 Moreover, as the theory would predict, landlords
 of sharecroppers did engage in investments. They generally tried to
 consolidate their holdings, they built hedges and enclosures, and they
 endowed their property with more livestock. In Burgundy, they intro-
 duced and commercialized high quality wines.'3 And if they failed to
 adopt all of the techniques that revolutionized farming in England, the
 reason may lie in part with soils that would not accept the improvements
 and factor prices that made them uneconomical.'4
 I do not mean to defend the agricultural system of Old Regime
 France, for its inefficiency and inequality are indisputable. Elucidating
 these problems of French agricultural history, though, will require more
 thoughtful explanations than historians have devised in the past. In
 particular, historians will have to pay closer attention to the economic
 consequences of Old Regime politics.
 12 Merle, La metairie, pp. 161-85; Dontenwill, "Les baux A mi-fruits," pp. 179-208.
 13 Merle, La metairie, pp. 49-62, 71-79, 102-06, 124-37; Jean Jacquart, "Immobilisme et
 catastrophes," in Georges Duby and Armand Wallon, eds., Histoire de la France rurale, vol. 2
 (Paris, 1975), pp. 226-35.
 14 Merle, La metairie, pp. 137-38; cf. Patrick K. O'Brien and Caglar Keyder, Economic Growth
 in Britian and France, 1780-1914 (London, 1978).
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